THE MEVLANA MOSQUE IN BERLIN-KREUZBERG:
AN UNSOLVED CONFLICT

Gerdien Jonker

1. A History of Mosque Building in Germany

Germany has no colonial memory. During the age of colonialism it made an effort to secure power and possession in other continents just like most European countries did. However, colonialism's phases hardly had an impact on German everyday life. Neither people nor goods were transferred in such numbers as to influence population statistics or popular culture (A Cambridge History of Africa: 1154). The first memory of Muslim presence is intertwined with Germany's history of two World Wars. The big boom in the middle of the 1960s, when this country rose to wealth and cheap labour from the Balkans and Turkey was deemed necessary, finally brought Muslims in big numbers. Muslim presence prior to this date is scant and hardly left any traces. Germany's history of mosque building mirrors this state of affairs.

During World War I Muslim prisoners of war held in captivity near Berlin were given permission to build a wooden mosque, but after the war camp was given up the building fell in disrepair and was soon after demolished. (Höpp 1992) Once it had disappeared, Muslim diplomats promoted the building of a new mosque in Berlin proper and in 1927 a miniature copy of the Taj Mahal was erected in the borough of Wilmersdorf. During the Second World War its imams sympathised with the National-Socialists. But after the war a new mosque leader took a leading position in tracing and helping Muslim displaced persons in Germany (Ahamadiyya Jamaat Archive in Berlin - unpubl.). Today, this mosque still functions as a cult place for the Ahmadiyya branch. Being Ahmadiyya is also the reason why, within the very animated fabric of Muslim religious life in Berlin, this is the one and only mosque, which is widely avoided by other Muslims.

The end of World War II brought some other changes as well. A considerable number of Tartar and other Muslim combatants who had sided with the German armies were now left stranded in Germany. Some were repatriated but most decided to stay and built Muslim communities in several urban centres - Munich and Aachen among these. Its founders, bluntly earmarked as war criminals, tried very hard to keep a low profile and as a consequence they did not undertake the construction of recognisable cult places. And so it happened that, in the 1970s, only some Persian businessmen in Hamburg managed to erect a second noteworthy Islamic cult place, and as late as the early 1990s, a third one was erected in Hamburg.

Between 1965 and 2001 the Muslim population in Germany rose from an almost negligent number to three and a half million people. The newcomers satisfied their religious needs with makeshift places. They neither possessed money or networks to act in a different way. But above all, these men did not feel the necessity to erect buildings of lasting presence, as returning home still dominated their view of the future. Therefore, they preferred to hire cheap places situated more often than not on the verge of the city and kept community life as invisible as possible. It took thirty years until this temporality became a thing of the past. As long as it lasted approximately 2.400 improvised prayer halls were installed (Antwort Bundestag 2000).

A basic change in attitude occurs around 1995 when the two main Turkish Muslim organisations in Germany, the Islam Kültür Merkezi and the Islamic Community of Milli Görüsh, start to buy building plots. Expectations of the future have slowly been changing and the idea of returning home has given way to the realisation that the next generations is planning to stay in this country. Community members increasingly adopt the opinion that their religious taxes (Zakat) must be spent on some real estate. Everywhere in the country, local mosque communities suddenly apply for building permissions, however, in this stage they still do not state claims for publicly recognisable mosques (Milli Görüsh: annual reports 1995-2000; Jonker 2002). Five years later, in January 2000, the German law on citizenship changes and as a result half a million Muslims apply for German citizenship. For mosque builders and politicians alike this date represents a major watershed. The systematically neglected matter of visible religious worship for Muslims has finally become a public issue.

Ever since, conflict is in the air. The German institutional frame for the integration of migrants has been traditionally limited to the labour market. Consequently, attempts to erect structural communication between Muslim communities and institutions of majority society had been hardly undertaken (Soysal 1994: 61-4). Locally, the churches installed inter-religious dialogues but these did not teach mosque administrators to apply for government money nor to deal with building authorities. Thirty years of structural isolation in Germany have left their imprint on living together, giving way to a deep distrust of motives, ethics and morals on both sides. As a consequence, wherever plans for mosque constructions become known, municipalities, neighbours, churches or the media blocks these.

At the University of Giesen, a handbook has now been written to steer through the many mosque conflicts that are popping up almost everywhere (Legewie/ Joosten/Rech 2002). The authors diagnose on the part of majority society a deep fear of change in the minority-majority balance. Thus, independent of the political preferences of the mosque builders, indifferent also to the fact whether these are Sufi, heterodox Alevi or Islamist Milli Görüsh, building projects are presently being rejected, they claim. In an average conflict there usually is only one Muslim party. The others consist of the municipality, local politicians, construction authorities, neighbours, local churches and the media. Conflict seems to crystallise in four different forms, which the authors have captured in the following manner:

The undesired mosque. Mosque builders express their wish to acquire a certain plot as a construction site vis-á-vis the construction authorities. Either the media or the neighbourhood gets wind of this and starts a vigorously protest. The mosque builders drop their plan and try their luck somewhere else.
The invisible mosque. A make shift prayer hall has slowly but gradually been enlarged and finally acquired as a property. Due to this change, authorities inspect the premises and notice serious defaults such as a missing fire escape or lacking toilet facilities. But for reasons of there own, they decide to condone the situation and keep it silent.
The protected mosque. Local politicians have decided to stimulate and protect the construction of a mosque for reasons of their own.
The discursive mosque. Mosque builders already acquired a plot and now are in the process of defending their plan in public. In this case, all actors will be on stage for a prolonged stretch of time: neighbours, politicians, authorities, churches and the local media may argue against, or take sides with, the mosque builders. The mosque community itself may feel misunderstood and suddenly break off communications. Then again, co-operation with the outside world may get underway and the mosque management goes through a phase of internal differentiation, allowing for the young generation to play a responsible part.
The case discussed in this paper is of the latter, discursive kind and has a history of three years already. At this moment, the Muslim actor feels himself thoroughly misunderstood and has reacted with a series of lawsuits against the authorities, the media and several individuals. But before the conflict can be properly unfolded some remarks need to be made on Muslim co-habitation in the borough of Berlin-Kreuzberg. They will allow for the setting to appear in which this particular conflict could crystallise.

2. One event - two memories

Turks dominate Muslim life in Berlin. Back in the 1960s, next to Bosnians and Kosovarians, this city contracted Turks from Anatolia to do menial work. Most workers originated from secular countries - Turks having been raised in the laicistic Republic of Atatürk, Bosnians and Kosovarians under Tito's communism. Upon migrating to Germany not many migrants were interested in making a religious turn and those who did typically came from a rural background with very little education. Turks also imported the Turkish agony over the role of religion. Turkish laicists fiercely deny traditional Muslim believers the right of self-organisation, instead accusing them of undermining the state balance and conspiring to introduce Shari'a as the ruling force of public life. After the military putsch of 1979, many Turkish Lefts, teachers and trade union people among them, took refuge in Berlin and considerably added to the already heated atmosphere.

Most of these newcomers went to live in Kreuzberg, a dilapidated borough in which migrants had already taken over the homes of the German working class. Mosques and communist action centres opened side-by-side and soon functioned as red flags for opposing fractions. Then, in March 1980, a demonstration took place in front of the Mevlana mosque. This mosque is situated on Kreuzbergs' main square, the Kottbusser Tor. The mosque founders had decided to take advantage of their favourable position and publicly expressed solidarity with Afghan Muslims who of recent had been besieged by the Soviets. Not before long, an anti-demonstration consisting of Turkish Lefts appeared on the scene. The moment the two parties met a fight exploded and eyewitnesses claim that all present engaged in a short but furious man-to-man battle. When the police arrived twenty minutes later, most combatants had fled. But one young man was left bleeding in the square and died on his way to hospital. As he happened to be one of the Lefts, the Mevlana mosque community was then accused of having assisted in murder.

Memory of the fighting still lingers on. It sets the tone for the way this mosque, but also its organisation, the Islamic Federation of Berlin (IFB) plus its co-opted partner Milli Görüsh are still being perceived. In the streets of Kreuzberg, in the offices of its municipality and in the local committees deciding upon youth initiatives, kindergarten, new destinations of old plots, religious visibility and many more subjects that touch upon living together, both are treated like the devil. Twenty-two years have moulded the event into a collective memory that acts as a warning against all Muslim activity. The majority of non-Muslim Kreuzberg inhabitants generally watches Muslim public presence with suspicion and is unwilling to discern between first, second and third generations. As a rule, young Muslim social workers asking for public recognition, Muslim women seeking co-operation for their kindergarten, or mosque communities applying for public sustenance are denied help. And Turkish laicists, now occupying political, administrative and trade union positions in the borrow of Kreuzberg, do their best to keep this collective memory in place.

On the Muslim side, the fighting led to a significant counter memory. It is expressed in the way religious Muslims have chosen to be represented. In October 2001, when I first retraced this piece of city history and interviewed its main protagonists, it occurred to me that those men, who, back in 1980, had been instrumental in the organisation of the Mevlana mosque demonstration, today were still occupying all leading religious functions. Both the imam of the Mevlana mosque, the head-imam of the Islamic Federation and the leader of the local Milli Görüsh network, to name but the main protagonists, had been in authoritative religious positions ever since.

Thus, several elements add to the present isolated position of the Islamic Federation in Berlin and its co-operation partner Milli Görüsh. A general suspicion, fed by the memory of the disastrous event and kept alive by laicist Turks, seems to take the lead. Muslim leadership, drawing its authority from that same event, answers it with a suspicion of its own, one that is built on non-communication. To complicate matters, these Muslim religious officials mainly consist of self-made men with little formal education who never properly took hold of the German language. Their acute awareness of not being wanted is wedded to a scanty knowledge of their immediate surroundings. The lack of information, which results from this forces them to mould every confrontation with "the outside" into an inimical frame of overwhelming generality. According to this frame, the world of the unbelievers (Kuffir) invariably despises the Muslim Umma and oppresses the true believers. Actual instances of discrimination of members of the community are invariably taken as a proof and motor for further mobilisation. What keeps this community together is the acute awareness of being discriminated. Its alleged status of victim calls for solidarity inside the community as well as a high degree of social closure to the outside world.

As far as society at large is concerned, Milli Görüsh and its local partners are social isolated. In all matters that concern the non-Muslim world, its leaders depend on information of, and translation by the younger generation. As they control all information that passes from the outside into the heart of the community, these young men function as gatekeepers. The elder generation, those religious officials who one were the founding fathers, has no experience with, and no practical knowledge of the functioning of local administrations. And whenever something goes wrong, they as a matter of course do not have the capacity to judge why this is so. Miscommunications only strengthen their conviction that "the West" does not like "Islam". Occasionally this gives rise to over-reactions. The conflict over the building of a new Mevlana mosque will help to analyse in detail how these come about.

3. The phases of the conflict (1)

In 1999, the Mosque Foundation, the executive body of both the Islamic Federation. (representing twelve different mosques), and Milli Görüsh (representing youth- and women's organisations in those same mosques), buys a plot adjacent to the old Mevlana mosque (2). The plot is purchased on behalf of the Mevlana mosque community from a private owner and the total sum paid 1,5 Million Euro. For more than ten years, the Mevlana mosque community had tried in vain to purchase this particular piece of land. For fear of loosing its community members to other mosques, it had wanted to erect a new and bigger Mevlana mosque as close as possible to the old place. So, at the first possible occasion it is willing to pay whatever is being asked. However, after the purchase was concluded and the first joy spent, the Mosque Foundation, and, some time after that, the members of the Mevlana mosque, discover they had been cheated.

As appears now, the plot is situated in a development area and its actual value fixed officially on only half the sum paid. Upon discovering this, the Mosque Foundation, who acted on behalf of the Mevlana community and presently experiences loss of face, starts a lawsuit - not against the former owner but against the Municipality. It accuses the authorities of changing the destination of the area deliberately so as to enable an increase of prizes. They actually accuse the municipality to hinder the Mosque Foundation to build mosques at all. The Municipality however claims the following:
The building party did not care to seek information beforehand. We offer free advisement to everybody; we keep a vacant lots archive, which informs on prizes and destinations of all plots in this neighbourhood. It is in the interest of all buyers to seek the information available before they buy. It is a mystery to me why these people never came (Burgomaster of Kreuzberg on 20/11.2001).

Against this position the Mosque Foundation holds a different view. For one thing, it claims to have ordered an official expert's opinion beforehand. But also, it seems to have been under some pressure:

They (the Mevlana community) have been waiting to buy this plot for 14 long years. They badly wanted it because of its position adjacent to the present Mevlana mosque. Other plots were never considered, so for us executors there was no need to seek advice or to consider other plots. This is what they wanted! When we bought the plot, it still belonged to the development area in which prizes cannot be raised (Sanierungsgebiet). But after the purchase the municipality started to change area destinations. We think they did that on purpose to keep us from building (Chairman of milli görüsh and of the Mosque Foundation on 15/11.01).

While the law case is still pending, a conflict over the preliminary notice (Baubescheid) comes to put a new strain on the relationship between the Kreuzberg building authority and the Mosque Foundation.
In June 2000, a year after the purchase, a first preliminary notice is delivered to the building authority. In this notice, the mosque builders suggest to renovate the old building and add one half-stock. They also promise to keep within the building limits of 2000m2. The notice is received positively and a meeting arranged to settle the details. Once this is done to everybody's contentment, the building authority urges its new partner to finalise the construction plan before unification with the neighbouring borough of Friedrichshain is realised. Friedrichshain is one of the former socialist, Eastern Berlin boroughs and in Kreuzberg it is expected that the fusion will bring severe political changes (and indeed, three months later, the sitting Green party has to make place for the Eastern Socialists).

After green light has been given, the mosque construction can now be realised. But the Mosque Foundation does not start proceedings. For one thing, it slowly dawns upon those responsible that the Mevlana mosque community is not content at all. To most of these people there seems to be no sound relation between the total sum of money paid (1,5 Million Euro) and the actual scope of the building project (only 2000 m2). But because the head of the board of the Mevlana mosque community is also acting as supervisory board for the Mosque Foundation, discontentment, although tangible, it is not openly expressed. Nevertheless, the Mosque Foundation feels the pressure and consequently, in October 2000, it delivers a new preliminary notice to the authorities. In this second notice the Mosque Foundation - more in line with the conceptions of Mevlana mosque community - suggests to erect a new building of 3500 m2.

The new plan does not meet the expected agreement. On the contrary, the building authority accuses the Mosque Foundation to deliberately neglect all building prescriptions. It appears that the fire escape can not be realised without access to the neighbouring yard. The new building is too high and its mass index not at all in relation to the ground available. Besides, the new facade is critiqued as too elaborate and not befitting the neighbourhood, and the minarets are judged far too high. But the Mosque Foundation, under pressure of the Mevlana mosque community, refuses to take back any of its proposed changes. The building authority refuses consent and, as a result, communication is once again stuck.

Nevertheless, a third, informal meeting can be arranged during winter. It is meant to clear things but only brings more trouble. During the meeting the Mosque Foundation offers a third preliminary notice in which it insists on the proposed 3500 m2 but now also has added the construction of a big shopping mall under the mosque. This plan manages to bristle up the authorities, because according to regulations, religious and commercial undertakings belong in different sections and can never be combined. Old suspicions flare up and the Kreuzberg municipality blames its Muslim partner that, in reality, it harbours plans for a parallel community, parallel communities being the phantom against which this leftist government fights. After this meeting, constructive contacts between the Mosque Foundation and the building authorities now definitely belong to the past.

In the months following this event, two opposing positions crystallise that both generalise and simplify what has actually happened. This for instance is what the Mosque Foundation claimed:

The proposed combination of religion, culture and business is genuinely islamic! A shopping mall could also guarantee us with a stable income and help to pay off debts. It was a good plan, because it guaranteed durability for the mosque (Preacher of the Mevlana mosque on 5/11.2001).

But the building authority saw the whole affair in a different light:
A cultic space in combination with cultural and social services can be easily realised. We are not against that. A shopping mall belongs in a different department all together. It is against all existing regulations (Burgomaster of Kreuzberg on 20/11.2001).

The Muslim party was also aware of the fact that the city authorities just gave permission to a medical centre to construct one 100% of the mass index on a site situated exactly opposite from the old Mevlana mosque:
The same regulations are on this side of the street as on that side. If they got the permission, we can also have the permission. Those builders could prove they are needed. We can also prove we are needed. Our argument is that there are 40.000 Muslims around Kreuzberg - a group of inhabitants for whom no real mosque centre is available (The Muslim architect on 3/11/2001).

When being asked, the municipality refused to comment the blatant difference in treatment, thus feeding Muslim suspicion that those Kuffir after all were dishonest and discriminated against 'Islam'.

In February 2001 finally, the conflict culminates in a local press scandal. The lawyer of the Mosque Foundation publicly claims that Muslims are being discriminated. He accuses the city authorities to try to prevent the mosque from being built. The burgomaster feels personally offended by this. In the past, he claims, he has defended the construction of a mosque in Kreuzberg against all sorts of oppositions, including those in his own department and his political party, and as a result, accusations have been very audibly voiced by his political opponents. However, a politician of the Green Party, he had stuck to the position - which in Kreuzberg he did not share with many political friends - that a main mosque is badly needed and should therefore be realised:
We supported this plan exactly because a mosque is needed. We never cared to look into the islamic organisation behind the Mosque Foundation, although they do have a bad reputation round here. As long as regulations are respected, we support the construction, I said. We also agreed that a new preliminary notice could be the solution, one, which was able to keep the balance between the first and the second notice. But I have not heard anything from these people anymore (Burgomaster of Kreuzberg on 20/11/2001).

After the press scandal the tone between the two parties hardened considerably. Meanwhile, the Mosque Foundation tried to solve the problem of square meters through the purchase of a second plot, adjacent to the first one. Once this plot will be obtained, or so it argued, the Mosque Foundation will be allowed for sure to build the proposed 3500 m2. Luck seemed to be on its side as the owner of the plot at least showed some interest to sell. But once again, the Mosque Foundation refused to seek information at the municipality on its destination plan. It therefore came as a total surprise that the new plot could not be used as a construction site.

Other problems remained unsolved as well. The shopping mall for instance, as much as it might be needed by the Mevlana mosque community to finance the construction, was not likely at all to pass regulations. On the other hand, members of the Mosque Foundation meantime changed their mind on a whole range of aspects that came under critique of the building authority. In due course they withdrew the all-too-elaborate facade as not essential; they renounced the minarets, as the call for prayer could also take place indoors; and they critiqued their Muslim architect for being too fancy. All this they now stated as irrelevant for mosque construction after all. The community even tried several times to contact non-Muslim architects. But the three conflict fields discussed so far, the purchase and its aftermath, the immoderate proportions of the second and third preliminary notices and the recent media squabble, managed to scare most candidates off.

4. Money problems

There still remains the problem of finance to be discussed. During the last years, the Mevlana mosque community saw itself under increasing pressure, as the monthly rent could not be met any more. As a consequence, the owner of the building in which the present mosque is located, having missed rent for several months, started a lawsuit to get rid of his renter. This development added considerable pressure to the realisation of the new Mevlana construction plans. When the purchase finally took place in 1999, the community was able to collect fresh capital on a considerable scale. Many members appeared to be willing to invest their savings in a representative project that after all was likely to outlast them. After the crash donations dwindled again. As the Imam of the Mevlana mosque pointed out, members now want to see some action first before they decide to invest more. The Mosque Foundation thus found itself under a double strain. In order to attract more private capital, it had to create evidence through visible building activities. But negotiations to obtain the necessary building permission got stuck without a solution in sight. Meanwhile, bank instalments were pressing.
In this situation, an application for public money seemed to be the only way out. The Mosque Foundation therefore turned to a governmental sponsoring agency, erected for the sustenance of local urban initiatives (Quartiersmanagement) and applied for half a million Euro. Its argument ran that the whole neighbourhood could benefit from a mosque centre with social services attached. But the sum appeared to be far too high for the Quartiersmanagement budget, which yearly receives exactly half a Million Euro - a sum that needs to be divided among a host of small local projects. Members of the Quartiersmanagement board even felt insulted by the excessive nature of the application. Upon hearing their application had been rejected, both the Mosque Foundation, the community members, the Imam and the milli görüsh officials could not begin to understand why it should have been rejected at all. "The government should be thankful for our work", is what they said:
What we do is badly needed round here. We take care of our youth. We imbue people with morals and ethics. We teach them to live together. What more do they want? (Head Imam of the Islamic Federation on 24/10/2001).

Here then, another basic difference appears into view. On the Muslim side, people feel that their efforts are belittled and the importance of their work neglected. The impression serves once again the suspicion that, when all is said and done, the Kuffir only despises Muslims. On the governmental side however, there is the acute impression that the Muslim party acts with unacceptable brazenness on the grounds that it does not in the least consider to integrate in major society.
And indeed, a new affair came just in time to fortify this scepticism. In Mai 2001, the Mosque Foundation managed to contract a non-Muslim architect for the development of an application in the sector of Ecological Building and Urban Integration for one of the other milli görüsh mosques. However, when, in December 2001, the very first pre-application was refused on the grounds that the mosque in question did not show enough signs of integrating into major society, the Mosque Foundation rudely dropped this architect without payment. The incident strengthened general suspicion that for milli görüsh. 'living together' includes Muslims only.

In the course of 2001, while the conflict is still raging, the Mosque Foundation suddenly starts to buy five more plots in the Kreuzberg area and beyond, announcing the construction of five more mosques. Surprise in the neighbourhood! What has happened? Five more mosque communities, all of them monitored by the Islamic Federation and sympathising with milli görüsh, have finally decided to invest in something permanent. For these communities, the Mevlana mosque all the while had acted as a trend-setter, the impressive drawings of the projected mosque fuelling their fantasy. In each community, a board of members went through its own motions of developing plans for the future and in the end each of these decided to dedicate its share of religious taxes (Zakat) to the project of their very own permanent prayer hall. As some members also announced to be willing to add their savings, these communities could then turn to the Mosque Foundation with a request for help. In short, two years after the Mevlana community started to fight for its plans, five more communities were ready to take the same course. The Islamic Federation monitors a total of twelve mosques, but the city of Berlin harbours a total of 82 prayer halls. Taking this into account, it can reasonably be expected that others will follow in the near future.

Hearing about the Mosque Foundations' recent purchases both the Quartiersmanagement and the municipality saw their suspicions against milli görüsh re-enforced. This time, officials misinterpret the fact that the Mosque Foundation is fluid enough to purchase other plots. Both the building authorities, the sponsoring bodies and the press turn a blind eye on the fact that behind the Mosque Foundation stand a host of individual communities with their own decision patterns. In fact, nobody seemed to be really informed on the internal mechanisms of Muslim communities in general. Instead, the press blandly suggested that the Mosque Foundation retain other, illicit sources of income. The word 'oil money' crystallises and is accepted as an explanation without much ado.
In sum, as far as money is concerned, the three conflict fields earlier discussed in this paper appear to be flanked by several more conflicts over money applications. In every one of these conflicts the Mosque Foundation, and, through this body, the Islamic Federation and its co-operation partner milli görüsh have come out as the loosing party. It is therefore worthwhile to take note of the fact that over the last years the Mosque Foundation experienced a steady loss of face, both in front of society at large, and, more serious still, in front of its own mosque communities. To these serious blemishes minor stitches have been added. The general misinterpretation of the Muslim communities' willingness to spend their money on a noteworthy representation may serve as an example. All this has put the Mosque Foundation in a furious defence. Its main reaction, apart from rousing the media against the burgomaster, has so far exhausted itself in a string of law cases against all institutions and individuals that frustrate its aims. Needless to say that this tactic does not heighten the Islamic Federations' chances for communication and, eventually, co-operation.

5. Continuation of the conflict after 9/11

In the aftermath of September the 11, the German Government heightened its already considerable pressure on milli görüsh. The organisation came under heavy surveillance, milli görüsh members were barred from political party-membership and, finally, they were refused German citizenship on the grounds that milli görüsh members were officially doubted to possess any loyalty to the constitution. In response, both within the milli görüsh organisation and within the mosque communities of its local partner, the Islamic Federation, internal pressure managed to rise to an unbearable degree.

One is tempted to think that, in the following, the Islamic Federation of Berlin lost its head. After 30 years of close co-operation, it decided to claim independence from its partner milli görüsh. Hitherto both partners denied to have had any relationship whatsoever and in order to push this view through, the lawyer of the Mosque Foundation threw a ban on everybody daring to say the contrary. People of the press, civil servants and also we as researchers were threatened with lawsuit the moment one would produce a different view. And by the middle of 2002, at least one 150 private persons and institutions were challenged to defend their divergent opinions in court. This behaviour, although extremely damaging communicational relationships, had a very good reason indeed. As soon as the liaison between the two organisations could be officially established, the Islamic Federation feared, this organisation could loose its right to give religious instruction in State schools (Jonker 2001a, 2001b).

By way of Conclusion

The conflict over the building of a mosque in Berlin, of which only the main phases have been described here, left little room for contentment. At least, the purchase of the plot after a waiting period of more than ten years must have caused satisfaction on the part of the Mevlana mosque community. The initial sentiment was quickly spoilt once it was discovered it had been cheated. The reaction following this discovery was based on a much older sentiment of enmity towards majority society. A second moment of contentment must have been felt when the first preliminary notice was accepted and both parties had agreed to start proceedings as quickly as possible. This time, good feelings spoilt by the inability of the Mosque Foundation to mediate between the conditions of the municipality and the expectations and needs of the Mevlana mosque community. Again, the reaction of the Muslim party was wrapped up in the much older suspicion of being discriminated against.

Despite the good will of some of the actors, suspicions and collective certainties about 'the other' that had not been verified kept dominating the conflict. What both parties lacked therefore was accurate knowledge about the internal structures, the inner necessities and the resulting outlook of their conflict partner. This culminated in a series of misunderstandings, which were followed by actions that managed to infuriate the other party even more. Finally, the curve of anger and mistrust was topped by the event of September 11. After this date, as happened in other countries of the EU as well, the German Government heightened its surveillance of, and pressure on, Muslim organisations, especially those with an islamist tinge

Several reasons present themselves to explain this development. I started out this contribution with the remark that Germany was not structurally prepared for, nor publicly aware of a Muslim population within its borders. The German Parliament was not aware of the religious dimension of the new citizens till 1999 and even German scholarship has not found proper ways yet to map and analyse the presence of this new religious minority. Historically, from the point of view of German majority society, the situation could be called unaccustomed, if not for the experiences of the last thirty years. During this time, the Muslim population went largely unacknowledged as part of society while suspicion its culture and motives grew.

On the side of the Muslim partner, historical conditions too set the scene for its seemingly puzzling behaviour. The milli görüsh organisation started as a religious protest movement in 1970s, attracting the poorest and lowest social strata of Turkish society. With the Turkish migrants, a flaring inner-Turkish conflict over religious self-determination was brought to Germany. In the borrow of Kreuzberg, which is also called little Istanbul for being the biggest Turkish city outside Turkey, milli görüsh was soon publicly stamped off as 'the devil', socially ostracised and politically avoided. The milli görüsh religious leaders consisted of self made men with very little education and with no knowledge of the German language. Up till today, their knowledge of German society depends on gatekeepers, young men who transport the information they deem necessary. As a result of these two factors, encounters with the outside world that were experienced as incomprehensible or downright unfriendly were dubbed as discrimination. And the organisation soon wrapped itself in a simple worldview in which 'the unbelievers' despised the Muslim umma.

As the handbook on mosque conflicts has taught us, the Berlin situation, although definitely flavoured with a local Kreuzberg tinge, is no exception in this country. The contribution of my fellow authors indicate that it is also part of the European struggle with the new Muslim presence. Undesired and debated Muslim prayer halls seem be in the to majority and invisible or even protected mosques do not occur all that often. The institutionalisation of Islam in Western Europe, in which the visibility of this religion plays a major part is going through a difficult phase.

Notes

(1) Between October 2001 and January 2002 interviews were made in Berlin with Milli Görüsh officials, the Head Imam (Basimam) of the Islamic Federation; the preacher of the Mevlana Mosque, both the architect and the lawyer of the Mosque Foundation as well as the burgomaster of Kreuzberg. Besides, several interested parties, such as architects and politicians working in the Kreuzberg borough, were asked their opinion.

(2)Only three people rule this body: The Head Imam of the Islamic Federation of Berlin, the chairman of the Mevlana Mosque Community, who is also the chairman of the local Milli Görüsh branch, and the chairman of Müsiad. A young Muslim lawyer acts as their executive. A Muslim architect had been taken on board on a temporary basis only.

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